Mechanism Design

ESEM
Presenter(s) Type Length Chair Room Number Add to calendar
Wanchang Zhang Toan Le Mengxi Zhang Contributed Sessions 30/08 16:30 CEST
75
mins
Mengxi Zhang
40.S02
Add to Calendar 2023-08-30 16:30:00 2024-04-19 13:23:39 EEA-ESEM 2023: Mechanism Design. Room: 40.S02 EEA-ESEM 2023 congress@eeassoc.org Europe/Rome public

Papers

(Listed in order of presenters above)

Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism

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A theory of incomplete information bargaining weights based on complete information bargaining

Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses and Adverse Selection

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Presentations

Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism

A theory of incomplete information bargaining weights based on complete information bargaining

Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses and Adverse Selection